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THE GREAT RAILROAD RAID
by Edwin C. Bearss
Washington, D. C.
The following is the first portion of a tioo-part article
which relates the story of a Union raid on Confederate rail-
road supply lines in the late summer of 1863. Iowa's 2d, 3d
and 4th Cavalries played a significant role in the action.
Part II of "The Great Railroad Raid" will appear in the
winter issue of the Annals. Sources will he given at that
time.
Part I
Following his return to Big Black River from Jackson,
Miss., in late July 1863, Maj. Gen. William T. Sherman began
looking for new ways to harass the battered Gonfederate
forces in Mississippi. Meantime, reliable reports had reached
the Union authorities at LaGrange, Tenn., that there were 60
locomotives and more than 350 cars at Water Valley. The
same informants told the Union commander at LaGrange,
Gol. John K. Mizner, that the bridge across the Tallahatchie
was standing and that the Mississippi Gentral Railroad be-
tween Grand Junction, Tenn., and Oxford, Miss., was passable.
They informed the colonel that there were a number of breaks
in the track between Oxford and Water Valley.
When he relayed this intelligence to his immediate superi-
or. Brig. Gen. Grenville M. Dodge, Mizner asked permission
to try to capture the rolling stock. To insure the success of
the projected raid, Mizner asked Dodge to reinforce his
cavahy striking force with 3,000 infantry and a regiment of
engineers.
Dodge on July 28 forwarded the correspondence regarding
the rolling stock to the commander of the XVI Gorps, Maj.
Gen. Stephen Á. Hurlbut; in Memphis. Dodge argued that
it would be possible for him to send 2,000 cavalry to Water
Valley and still have enough troopers left to protect the Mem-
phis and Gharleston Railroad. The cavalry would be followed
by infantry and engineers.
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Dodge believed that the Federals would have to act
promptly. If Jackson had been evacuated by Sherman's army.
Dodge reasoned, the Confederates would start moving the
engines and cars south of the Yalobusha. Furthermore, if the
Federals were to capture the rolling stock, they would have to
strike secretly and swiftly, because it was reported that the
Confederates had filled the cars with combustibles.
Before giving Dodge the go-ahead, Hurlbut decided to
contact Maj. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant. Hurlbut's communication
reached Grant's Vicksburg headquarters on August 4. The
energetic Grant decided to employ two raiding columns in
an effort to bag this valuable prize.
Writing Hurlbut, Grant pointed out that the destruction
of the railroads centering on Jackson by Sherman's forces
would prevent the Southerners from transferring the badly
needed engines and cars to other parts of the Confederacy.
If the work involved in rebuilding the bridges on the Missis-
sippi and Tennessee Baüroad between Memphis and Grenada
wouldn't be too great. Grant thought that it might be profit-
able for the Federals to send out a force charged with their
reconstruction. When the hridges had been rebuilt, the rolling
stock could be taken to Memphis.
Grant informed Hurlhut that he would send a raiding
column from Vicksburg to collect "all rolling-stock and take
it as far north as the road is in running order." Hurlbut was
to send troops from Memphis to meet the Vicksburg cavalry-
men and cover the working parties charged with rebuilding
the bridges on the Mississippi and Tennessee Baikoad. The
Memphis column was to move out "as early as possible."
At the same time. Grant addressed a note to Shemian.
Grant informed Sherman of the scheme which he had out-
lined to Hurlhut. Sherman was to cooperate in the under-
taking. A fast-moving cavalry column (ahout 1,000 strong)
would leave the Vicksburg perimeter and march on Grenada.
Acknowledging Grant's communication, Shemian sug-
gested that a tin-clad and a transport loaded with supplies
be sent to Yazoo City. While en route to Grenada, the cavalry-
men would rendezvous with the naval force and draw ad-
ditional rations and forage. At Grenada, the troopers would
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burn the bridges across the Yalobusha, "so that the locoino-
tives and cars can alone be taken northward."
When Grant examined Sherman's communication, he was
shocked to see the reference to the destruction of the Grenada
bridges. Grant realized that if the bridges across the Yalo-
busha were burned as soon as the Vicksburg column reached
Grenada, it would be impossible to transfer the rolling stock
from the tracks of the Mississippi Gentral to the Mississippi
and Tennessee. Gautioning Sherman against a premature
destruction of the bridges. Grant pointed out that if the
cavalry started within the next 48 to 72 hours, it would be
soon enough.
Replying to Grant's note, Sherman observed that he didn't
plan for his cavalry to bum the Grenada bridges until all
the engines and cars had been shuttled to the Mississippi
and Tennessee Railroad. Sherman also informed Grant that
he had alerted his cavalry to be ready to ride on short notice.
Two days later, on the 6th, Grant addressed another
message to Sherman regarding the projected railroad raid.
Sherman was told to have his cavalry column ready to take
the field on the 10th. All rolling stock found on the Missis-
sippi Gentral was to be collected and moved northward. The
troopers were to push on until they encountered the Memphis
bluecoats.
Following receipt of this dispatch, Sherman issued a
Special Order placing hard-hitting Gol. Edward F. Winslow
in charge of the raiding force. Winslow's command was to
consist of the 3d and 4th Iowa, and the 5th Illinois Gavalr)'
Regiments. Before leaving their camp on Big Black, the
cavalry officers were to see that their men were provided
with four days' rations.
On August 8 Sherman forwarded a detailed set of in-
structions to Winslow. The colonel was to have his recently
organized brigade ready to ride at daybreak on the 10th.
The Union troopers were to head for the Benton road. On the
other side of Mechanicsburg, the raiders were to turn off
the Benton road and make for Yazoo Gity. They were to
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rendezvous at Yazoo City with a gunboat loaded with sup-
plies. As soon as his men had rested and drawn provisions,
Winslow was to proceed to Lexington. The raiders were to
push eastward from Lexington and strike the Mississippi
Central Railroad. Before advancing on Crenada, Winslow
was to throw out scouting parties to make sure that the
engines and rolling stock were stiU spotted on the section of
the railroad north of the Yalobusha. If there were any trains
south of Crenada, they were to be captured.
At Crenada, Winslow eould expect to meet the Union
raiding column sent south by Hurlbut. Winslow was to com-
municate with this force. Between them, the Union officers
were "to use all possible efforts to get these cars and loco-
motives into Memphis."
Sherman felt confident that the Memphis column would
have already repaired the Mississippi and Tennessee Rail-
road. He therefore believed that Winslow would encounter
no difficulty in running the captured trains into Memphis. In
ease the engineers and eonductors refused to work for the
Yankees, Winslow was authorized to "use foree to compel
them to work their engines and trains."
Following the fall of Vicksburg and the Confederate re-
treat from Cettysburg, the Washington govemment had
changed its policy: For the time being, efforts were to be
made to conciliate the people of the South wherever they
might come within reach of Union armies. Sherman accord-
ingly directed Winslow to "carry money," since "it is now
to the interest of our Covernment that all plundering and
pillaging should cease." Union men and small farmers along
the line of mareh were to be paid for their com, baeon, beef
and vegetables. Large planters were to be given a receipt,
signed by either Winslow's chief quartermaster or commis-
sary. Whenever one of his men's horses broke down, Winslow
was authorized to confiscate a remount, exchange the broken
down animal and give a certificate of the transaction fixing
the difference in value.
If, on reaching Grenada, Winslow found the Memphis
column strong enough to take eare of the rolling stock, his
brigade was to retum to the Vieksburg area by way of Yazoo
City. But, if there was any doubt, Winslow's troopers were to
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continue to Memphis, and return to Vicksburg by boat.
Crant's letter of August 4 reached Memphis on the 8th.
Replying immediately, Hurlbut announced that a force would
be sent down the Mississippi and Tennessee Railroad to co-
operate with the Vicksburg column.
According to tlie latest information reaching Memphis,
Hurlbut commented, the engines and cars were guarded by
a small detachment of Confederates. These men were said
to have orders to destroy the rolling stock at the first sign
of a Union advance.
Hurlbut was afraid that the cost of repaii-ing tlie railroad
would exceed the value of the stock. It was his opinion that
the rolling stock would have to be destroyed. If, however,
the engines and cars were still at Water Valley, Hurlbut con-
tinued, it would be less expensive to try to bring them to
Crand Junction over the Mississippi Central.
Two days later, news reached Hurlbut confirming that
the locomotives and cars were still at Water Valley. Accord-
ing to the latest reports, the Confederate authorities were re-
pairing the railroads in the Jackson area in an effort to remove
the desperately needed rolling stock to other sections of the
Confederacy. At this very moment, Hurlbut notified Crant,
an expedition was being organized at LaCrange. This force
would try to capture the trains, and, if practicable, escort
them to Crand Junction. Hurlbut felt certain that the Rebels
would destroy the rolling stock before the bluecoats could
reach it.
Hurlbut was confronted with problems in organizing a
force strong enough to insure the operation's success. To pro-
tect the Memphis and Charleston Railroad against Rebel
raiders, the Union officers had been compelled to disperse
their cavaliy. A concentration of the mounted units slated to
participate in the "great railroad raid" would have to be
effected. After studying his maps, Hurlbut decided to employ
three columns. These units were to advance out of the Union
bases at LaCrange, CoUierville and Pocahontas. Pushing south-
ward into north Mississippi, the columns were to rendezvous
at Oxford, 18 miles north of Water Valley.
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On August 11 Hurlbut telegraphed Mizner: "You wü]
dispatch as soon as practicable a force of cavalry and mounted
infantry, not less than 1,000 men . . . to proceed as rapidly as
possible to the neighborhood of Water Valley." This force
was to try to capture and bring in the rolling stock reportedly
operating on the Mississippi Gentral Railroad. To operate the
trains, the column would be accompanied by 50 men from
BisseU's Engineer Regiment of the West. If the expedition
were unable to bring out the engines and cars, they were to
be destroyed, especially the wheels and trucks. Information
had filtered through to Hurlbut that the Gonfederacy was
having a difficult time manufacturing wheels and axles.
The troopers from Mizner's command were to watch for
Winslow's column, which had reportedly left the Vicksburg
area on the 8th. So far as possible, the raiders were to refrain
from wrecking havoc on anything but the railroads; Hurlbut
calculated that the Federals might need the crops of north
Mississippi to supplement their commissary. On their return
march, the Federals were to bring in all able-bodied Negroes,
who expressed a willingness to enlist in the Union army.
In accordance with Hurlbut's directive, Mizner called for
Maj. Datus E. Goon of the 2d Iowa Gavalry. Goon was
handed a copy of Hurlbut's telegram and told to have 200
picked men of his regiment ready to take the field at 5 a.m.
on August 13. After crossing Wolf River, Goon's column was
to bear toward the southeast. If all went according to schedule.
Goon troopers would rendezvous with a second column at
Salem or Hickory Flats.
Gol. August Mersy, at Pocahontas, was alerted on August 11
to get the 9th Illinois Mounted Infantry ready to take the
field. Mersy on the morning of the 12th issued instructions
for Lt. Gol. Jesse J. Phülips to see that his men were
issued six days' rations and were ready to take the field by
noon. As so often happens in warfare, the troopers had drawn
their rations and ammunition by the stipulated time only to
find that there would be a delay. Phillips would have to wait
for the 50 engineers who were to accompany the expedition.
It was the afternoon of the 13th before all the engineers could
be supplied with mules.
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It was starting to get dark on August 13, when a courier
rode up to Phillips' Pocahontas command post with a second
message. Unfolding the scrap of paper, Phillips found that
he was to move out immediately, taking the road to Bipley
and Oxford. At Oxford, Phillips' regiment would rendezvous
with Coon's column.
Just as "Boots and Saddles" sounded, another staff officer
came pounding up with a telegram which Mersy had just
received from Mizner. Mizner wanted the Pocahontas Federals
to know that Coon's command had moved out at daybreak.
Consequently, Phillips' regiment was to bear ^vell to the west
so as to join Coon's column, "southwest of Salem or near
Hickory Flats."
Coon's Iowans had marched from LaGrange as scheduled.
At the crossing of the Wolf, Coon was reinforced by 200
men of the 3d Michigan and 100 men of the 11th Illinois
Cavalry. This gave the major a striking force of "500 well-
mounted men." From the Wolf, the column marched to Bipley,
where Coon expected to rendezvous with Phillip's regiment.
Although Coon didn't know it, Phillips' column was stul at
Pocahontas.
After waiting several hours. Coon decided to push on.
It was late in the afternoon when the head of the column
reached the Tippah Biver, which recent rains had caused
to boom. While the troopers were able to cross without too
much difficulty, the wagons and ambulances posed a problem.
To get them over the surging river, it was necessary to unload
them and place the contents on an old scow which was found
moored to the bank. Considerable time was lost by this opera-
tion. It was getting dark by the time the vehicles had been
ferried over the stream and had been reloaded. The troopers
spent the night of the 13th about two mues south of the ford.
At daylight, the blueclads pushed on to Hickory Flats,
where they arrived at 9 a.m. The inhabitants, when questioned
by Coon, reported tliat nothing had been seen or heard of
Phillips' column. Coon was puzzled. He wondered what could
have happened to the 9th Illinois Mounted Infantry. After
discussing the situation with his officers. Coon determined to
push on. Six hours later, the column rode up to Bocky Ford.
Two hours were lost in getting the troopers and their supply
154 ANNALS OF IOWA
wagons and ambulances across the Tallahatchie. Since time
was becoming increasingly important. Goon determined to
keep his men in the saddle until 7 p.m. The troopers spent
the night of August 14 at Pegee's plantation, five mues south-
west of Rocky Ford.
Goon saw that reveille was sounded in time for the
cavalrymen to make their toilet, eat their breakfasts and be
on their horses by daylight. At 10 a.m. the column entered
Oxford.
The "excessive heat" had exhausted the men and their
mounts. Upon occupying the town. Goon called a halt. Except
for the men detailed to raid the corn cribs in the area, the
rest of the brigade was allowed to rest.
Early in the afternoon, the outposts on the Rocky Ford
road sighted an approaching column. The alarm was sounded.
Within a few minutes, the newcomers identified themselves
as Phillips' command.
Darkness had enveloped the area on August 13, when the
330 troopers of the 9th Illinois Mounted Infantry rode out
of their Pocahontas encampment. Taking the Salem road, the
bluecoats forded Tippah River at Buck's Springs. After passing
through Hickory Flats, where Phillips leamed that Goon's
column was 24 hours ahead of him, the mounted infantry
struck for the Tallahatchie, which they crossed on the night
of the 14th. As soon as the last man had forded the river,
Phillips called a halt. The men and their mounts were allowed
to take a well deserved break. Phillips was troubled by his
failure to overtake Goon's column.
At 4 a.m. on August 15, Phulips and his officers aroused
the men. The march was resumed. As the troopers pushed on
toward Oxford, scouts were sent out to see if they could locate
Goon's troopers.
Phillips and his officers found Goon anxiously awaiting
their arrival. Untu Goon showed him a copy of Hurlbut's
August 11 wire to Mizner, Phillips had no idea of the "object
of the expedition." Since he believed that the success of the
raid depended on "rapidity of movement," Phillips announced
that the combined force would strike immediately for Water
Valley.
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The bugles sounded at 2 p.m. As soon as the officers had
fomied their units, the bluecoated horsemen rode out of
Oxford, taking the Water Valley road. Having leamed from
Coon that another column was en route to join the raiders,
Phillips called an early halt. Camp was established on the
night of August 15, six mues south of Oxford.
Lt. Col. Martin R. M. Wallace had been placed in
command of the third column. According to the instructions
received from Mizner, Wallace's command (picked men from
the 3d, 4th, and 9th Illinois Cavalry) was to leave CoUierville
on August 13. Wallace was to take the most direct route
from his base camp to the Abbeville crossing of the Tallachat-
chie.
Wallace lost no time in getting his command ready to ride.
WTien the column took up the march, it numbered 720 hard-
riding eavalrymen. Besides several ambulances and a number
of supply wagons, Wallace's force was aecompanied by four
12-pounder mountain howitzers.
From ColHerviUe, the troopers marched to Byhalia. As the
vanguard thundered into the village, a squad of Confederate
horsemen leaped into their saddles and fled. Troopers from
the 9th Illinois raced in pursuit. Like many of the Union
cavalry officers in the west, Wallace dressed his scouts in
citizen's garb. Whue this aided the Federals in getting in-
formation from unwary eivilians, it had its handicaps. One of
Wallace's uniformed troopers gunned down a scout from the
9th Illinois. The Rebels, having a good head start, escaped
their pursurers.
The brigade spent the night of August 13 camped on
Withers' plantation. Before retiring, a number of the blue-
clads slipped out of camp and raided the nearby planters'
orchards and gardens. Peaches, apples and watermelons were
found in abundance. Wallace had his men on the road at
daybreak. Co M, 4th Illinois was assigned the advance. Ten
mues southeast of Byhalia, the Yankee vanguard sighted a
Confederate patrol. Shots were exchanged. Seeing that they
were badly outnumbered, the Rebels beat a hasty retreat. One
hluecoat was wounded in this clash.
About a mile north of Cox's Corners, the Union advance
surprised and captured a Confederate courier. When he
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searched the man, Capt. Joseph E. Hitt of Co M 4th Illinois
found a note from Rebel Capt. W. C. Middleton addressed
to Maj. Alexander Chalmers. The message told of the march
of Wallace's command.
Passing through Waterford, Wallace's troopers reached
the Tallahatchie at nightfall. Since the recent rains had
caused a marked rise in the rivers of north Mississippi, the
Yankees had a difficult time crossing the Tallahatchie. It was
11 a.m. the next morning, tlae 15th, before the last man had
reached the south bank. The march was resumed. At Oxford,
Wallace learned that the units with whom his brigade was
to rendezvous had ridden southward several hours before.
Observing that the pace of the march was beginning to take
its toll, Wallace halted his troopers late on the afternoon of
the 15th at Buckner's plantation, two and one-half miles
south of Oxford. A patrol was sent racing ahead to notify
Phillips and Coon that Wallace would join them in the
morning.
Since Wallace was his junior, Phillips would be in charge
of the expedition. Phulips was shocked to discover that
Wallace, prior to his departure from CoUierviUe, had been
given no instructions beyond those entrusted to Coon.
« « a
Shortly after daybreak on August 10, Winslow's cavalry
officers had mustered and inspected their troopers. The 800
cavalrymen of the 3d and 4th Iowa, and the 5th Illinois
swung onto their mounts. By 5 a.m., the column was under
way.
The officers and men who were left behind cheered and
shouted encouragement to their comrades as they rode out
of\ the cavalry encampment on Big Black River. After leaving
thé Flowers' plantation cantonment area, Winslow turned
the head of his column into the Bridgeport road. Leaving the
Bridgeport road at Tiffintown and following a fann road, the
raiders headed for Neeley's plantation, where they entered
the Benton road. Many of the cavalrymen were familiar with
the Benton road. During the recent Vicksburg campaign, they
had started up this road several times — their object, the
railroad bridge across the Big Black at Way's Bluff. Each
time, the blueclads had been turned back by the Confederates.
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Since the brigade would be called on to make long, hard
marches, Winslow had carefully culled his command before
it left Flowers' plantation. Only the best conditioned men and
horses were taken. Most of the raiders were armed with hard-
hitting Sharp's or Union carbines. A number of the men, how-
ever, were stul equipped with "a variety of cavalry guns, in-
ferior in range and poor in construction." The troopers who
Were armed with these sub-standard weapons swore that they
had never been examined or tested by the War Department.
In accordance with Sherman's instructions, the cavalrymen
carried only four days' rations. Winslow expected to draw
additional supplies from the navy at Yazoo Gity. Realizing
that the success of the operation would depend on mobility,
Winslow had seen that all excess gear was left on Big Black.
Never was there "a lighter column. There was no train, not
a wagon, not even an ambulance or a pack mule."
To conserve the strength of the men and horses for the
hard marches which he knew were in the offing, Winslow
halted his brigade at 1 p.m. The cavalrymen camped on
either side of the Benton road, eight miles southwest of
Mechanicsburg. Sunrise on the 11th found the raiders again
on the road. A short distance beyond the fire-gutted ruins of
Mechanicsburg, the blueclads turned into the Yazoo Gity
road. Noon found the brigade at Roach's plantation, which
was within nine miles of Yazoo Gity. Winslow decided against
pushing on. Another early camp was made.
When the head of the column entered Yazoo Gity at 8
a.m. on August 12, Winslow was shocked to see no sign of the
Union Navy. Questioning the inhabitants, the colonel was dis-
gusted to learn that a gunboat, several transports and a num-
ber of troops had been at Yazoo Gity. These troops, the people
stated, had reboarded the steamboats at an early hour on the
previous day. The gunboat and transports had then started
down river. No one was able to tell Winslow whether or not
the Navy planned an early return to Yazoo Gity.
This unexpected turn of events presented Winslow with
a serious problem. He had no rations for the men or forage
for the horses. To make matters worse, the corn was not yet
ready to be harvested. A march to Grenada and, perhaps, to
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Memphis would take the brigade into an area of which the
colonel had little knowledge.
Winslow called a staff meeting; all of the commissioned
officers attended. After reading Sherman's letter of instruc-
tions to the group, Winslow requested their advice. Next, the
colonel asked the officers to express themselves on the ques-
tion, "whether to go forward or to retum if no supplies should
arrive." As was customary, the lowest ranking officer spoke
first; he advised a return to their base. Fach of the other
officers in his tum recommended the same course of action.
Winslow did not express an opinion at this time.
As soon as he had dismissed his officers, Winslow called
for his most experienced scout. The man was told to take a
strong mule and ride down the Valley road. He was to see if
he could contact the naval force which had left Yazoo City
the previous morning. WTiether he located the boats or not,
the scout was admonished to he back at Yazoo City hy 4 a.m.
on the 14th. The scout went as far as Satartia and was back at
Yazoo City by the designated hour. Beporting to Winslow,
he stated that "he had seen neither steamhoat nor troops, but
had leamed that they had passed below Satartia, presumably
on their retum to Vicksburg."
Despite his subordinates' opinion that the column ought
to retrace its steps, Winslow decided to press on. Questioning
the inhabitants, Winslow learned that a strong force of Con-
federate cavalry (WTiitfield's Texas Brigade) was stationed at
Canton. Winslow believed that if his brigade moved rapidly,
it could steal a day's march on the Texans. Once his column
had gained such a lead, the colonel felt that the Confederates
would be unable to overtake it. Orders were issued for the
regimental commanders to have their units ready to march
at a moment's notice.
« « «
The task of defending northwest Mississippi and the
Mississippi Central Bailroad had heen given to Brig. Gen.
James B. Chalmers' understrength command, numbering
about 1,700 effectives. To carry out his mission, Chalmers
deployed the 18th Mississippi Cavalry Battalion south of the
Memphis and Charleston Bailroad. The 2d Begiment Missis-
sippi State Cavalry was posted at Senatobia, whue Chalmers'
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main striking force, 682 strong, was massed at Panola. Two
regiments of Mississippi State Gavalry were out arresting
deserters and men who had fled their homes to avoid being
conscripted. A battalion of cavalry, the 6th Mississippi, was
camped near GarroUton.
Gen. Joseph E. Johnston, having received several sharp
notes from President Jefferson Davis on the subject, finally
began formulating plans to transfer the rolling stock from
the Mississippi Gentral to the Southem Rauroad of Missis-
sippi east of Jackson. Johnston accordingly issued orders for
Chalmers to see that the bridges and trestles on the railroad
north of Jackson which had been destroyed in late July by
the Federals were repaired. To facilitate this work and in
order to confer with Johnston, Ghalmers left Grenada on
August 11 for Ganton and Morton. Pending Ghalmers' retum.
Gol. W. F. Slemons would be in charge of the Gpnfederate
troops in northwest Mississippi.
Wlien Ghalmers reached Ganton on the 12th, he found
that Gonfederate Brig. Gen. William H. Jackson's cavalry
division had recrossed the Pearl. Jackson and a large number
of his men were in Ganton. During the day news reached
Ganton that the Yankees — Winslow's coliunn — had oc-
cupied Yazoo Gity. Slemons was notified of this possibly
dangerous development. The commander of the 6th Missis-
sippi Gavalry Battalion at Goüa was alerted to watch the
Yazoo Gity Yankees closely, and to rush his organized com-
panies to Vaughan's Station to guard stores.
Two days later, on the 14th, Slemons began receiving
alarming reports from his scouts in the area south of the
Memphis and Gharleston Railroad. Scout Givens had spotted
Wallace's column as it thundered through Byhalia, the pre-
vious afternoon. Besides observing that the Yankees took
the road to Wyatt, the scout had talked to several of the
Federals. In addition to obtaining an acciu^ate figure as to
the strength of Wallace's column, Givens was able to report
that the Federals had "eight ambulances, sLx wagons, with
eight days' rations, a number of spades, shovels, picks and
axes, and one pontoon bridge.
A second Gonfederate scout had sighted Goon's column
as it struck southeastward from LaGrange toward Salem. Like
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Civens, this man was able to converse with several of the
bluecoats. When questioned, the Yanks said they were en route
to Water Valley.
Upon receipt of this intelligence, Slemons sent several
staff officers galloping with orders for Cols. W. C. Falkner
and John McGuirk to collect their commands and report to
him. If at all possible, Falkner was to get his regiment of
Mississippi State Cavalry in position to keep Coon's eolumn
from crossing the Tallachatchie.
News reaching Slemons' headquarters on August 15 was
all bad. First, he leamed that on the previous day the Yazoo
City Yankees, Winslow's brigade, had started for Lexington
and Crenada. The Confederate commander at CarroUton
was urged to have his scouts shadow this force. In addition,
he would try to harass the Federals' advance by destroying
bridges and bushwhacking. McCuirk, who had eoneenerated
his regiment at Spring Dale, had plenty of information, all
discouraging, for Slemons.
The first report Slemons received from McCuirk was that
Coon's column had forded the Tallahatehie on the previous
evening and was striking for Oxford. Several hours later, Seout
Carmen rode into camp and reported that the Rocky Ford
column (Coon's) and the Abbeville eolumn (Wallace's) had
occupied Oxford.
In view of these developments, Slemons issued marehing
orders to his command. The colonel, accompanied by his
main striking force, left Panola for Crenada at 2 p.m. The
next day, the 16th, Slemons' troopers rode into Grenada.
There, the colonel was joined by McCuirk's regiment. Slemons
was disappointed to discover that his other detached com-
mands (the 6th and 18th Mississippi Cavalry Battalion, Falk-
ner's regiment, and the 2d Regiment Mississippi State Cavalry )
were missing. All told, he had a force of just a little over 700
effectives with which to fend off the Yankee columns which
were rapidly converging on Crenada from the north and
the south.
Slemons determined to use his understrength brigade to
oppose the Federals who were driving down the Mississippi
Central from Oxford, whue Jackson's division handled the
blueeoats who were pressing northward from Yazoo City.

